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Abstract		
With	nearly	6	billion	subscribers	around	the	world,	mobile	devices	have	become	an	indispensable	component	
in	modern	society.	The	majority	of	these	devices	rely	upon	passwords	and	PINs	as	a	form	of	user	authentica-
tion	and	the	weakness	of	these	point-of-entry	techniques	are	widely	documented.	Active	authentication	is	
designed	to	overcome	this	problem	by	utilising	biometric	techniques	to	continuously	assess	user	identity.	This	
paper	describes	a	feasibility	study	into	a	behaviour	profiling	technique	that	utilises	historical	application	usage	
to	verify	mobile	users	in	a	continuous	manner.	By	utilising	a	combination	of	a	rule-based	classifier,	a	dynamic	
profiling	technique	and	a	smoothing	function,	the	best	experimental	result	for	a	user’s	overall	application	us-
age	was	an	Equal	Error	Rate	(EER)	of	9.8%.	Based	upon	this	result,	the	paper	proceeds	to	propose	a	novel	be-
haviour	profiling	framework	that	enables	user’s	identity	verification	through	their	application	usage	in	a	con-
tinuous	and	transparent	manner.	In	order	to	balance	the	trade-off	between	security	and	usability,	the	frame-
work	is	designed	in	a	modular	way	that	will	not	reject	user	access	based	upon	a	single	application	activity	but	a	
number	of	consecutive	abnormal	application	usages.	The	proposed	framework	is	then	evaluated	through	
simulation	with	results	of	11.45%	and	4.17%	for	the	False	Rejection	Rate	(FRR)	and	False	Acceptance	Rate	(FAR)	
respectively.	In	comparison	to	point-of-entry	based	approaches,	behaviour	profiling	provides	a	significant	im-
provement	in	both	the	security	afforded	to	the	device	and	user	convenience.			
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1	Introduction	
With	nearly	6	billion	users	globally,	mobile	devices	have	become	ubiquitous	in	our	daily	life	[17].	The	modern	
mobile	handheld	device	is	capable	of	providing	many	multimedia	services	through	a	wide	range	of	applications	
over	multiple	networks	as	well	as	on	the	handheld	itself.	These	services	are	predominantly	driven	by	data,	
which	is	increasingly	associated	with	sensitive	information.	Indeed,	a	series	of	studies	have	highlighted	the	
vulnerability	of	mobile	devices	by	storing	personal	information	(e.g.	date	of	birth),	login	credentials	(i.e.	user	
name	and	password)	and	business	data	(e.g.	corporate	intellectual	property)	[20,	23,	30].	Therefore,	any	mis-
use	of	the	services	and	information	stored	upon	the	device	poses	a	threat	to	its	owner	when	the	device	is	lost	
or	stolen,	infected	by	malware	[26],	or	attacked	by	social	engineering	[13].	
	
The	most	popular	user	authentication	approach	is	the	password	or	Personal	Identification	Number	(PIN).	Alt-
hough	this	approach	is	available	on	most	mobile	devices,	a	survey	conducted	by	[9]	demonstrated	that	40%	of	
their	participants	failed	to	utilise	this	simple	security	mechanism.	In	addition,	possible	misuse	could	still	occur	
if	mobile	users	do	not	utilise	the	technique	properly,	such	as	never	changing	the	PIN,	writing	the	PIN	on	a	pa-
per	or	sharing	the	PIN	with	others	[6,	21].	However,	the	fundamental	weakness	of	the	PIN	based	approach	is	
that	as	a	point-of-entry	technique	it	does	not	validate	the	user’s	identity	again	once	the	initial	trust	is	obtained.	
DARPA	proposed	an	Active	Authentication	program	aiming	to	overcome	the	problem	of	the	point-of-entry	
technique	by	utilising	behavioural	based	biometrics	for	desktop	computing	[10].	According	to	the	principle	of	
the	DARPA’s	proposal	there	are	a	number	of	biometrics	that	have	the	potential	to	be	applied	within	the	mobile	
device	domain,	such	as	gait	recognition	and	keystroke	dynamics.	One	such	biometric	approach	is	behavioural	
profiling.	Its	particular	advantage	being	it	is	independent	of	the	service	being	utilised	(i.e.	you	need	to	be	walk-
ing	with	gait	and	typing	with	keystroke	analysis).	Based	upon	the	findings	from	a	series	of	feasibility	studies,	
this	paper	focuses	upon	demonstrating	a	novel	behavioural	profiling	framework	that	can	provide	continuous	
and	transparent	protection	for	mobile	devices.	
	
This	paper	begins	by	introducing	the	study	and	presenting	the	state	of	the	art	in	behavioural	biometrics	that	
have	been	applied	within	the	mobile	domain.	The	paper	then	proceeds	to	describe	a	comprehensive	experi-
mental	study	of	mobile	user	application	usage.	Based	upon	the	results,	a	novel	behaviour	profiling	framework	
that	will	provide	the	verification	of	a	mobile	user’s	identity	in	a	continuous	and	transparent	manner	is	pro-
posed	and	then	evaluated	through	simulation.	The	paper	concludes	by	highlighting	the	future	direction	of	
research.	
	
2	Behavioural	biometrics	for	mobile	devices	
	
The	use	of	biometrics	to	authenticate	a	person\textquoteright	s	identity	on	mobile	devices	has	been	an	estab-
lished	area	for	more	than	10	years.	In	1998,	Siemens	and	Triodata	developed	a	fingerprint	recognition	proto-
type	with	which	a	user	can	gain	instant	access	to	the	phone	by	swiping	their	finger	against	a	sensor.	In	2011,	
facial	recognition	was	utilised	to	unlock	mobile	users	devices	on	the	Samsung	Galaxy	Nexus	smartphone	[25].	
However,	these	physiological	biometric	techniques	are	mainly	deployed	to	offer	point-of-entry	security.	In	
comparison,	behavioural	biometric	methods	have	the	ability	to	continuously	and	transparently	verify	us-
er\textquoteright	s	identity.	However,	they	also	tend	to	have	features	that	are	noisier,	vary	more	over	time	
and	are	subject	to	various	environmental	aspects	that	can	affect	sample	collection	and	classification.	So	care	
must	be	taken	when	considering	their	implementation	particularly	in	active	authentication	where	less	control	
over	the	user	and	environment	exists.	
	
With	the	evolution	of	mobile	devices,	the	chance	to	adopt	other	biometric	based	authentication	approaches	
on	them	becoming	more	realistic.	Indeed,	some	devices	already	possess	a	number	of	inbuilt	sensors	that	are	
capable	of	collecting	a	variety	of	user	biometric	traits,	enabling	several	behavioural	approaches	to	be	deployed	
upon	them,	including:	behaviour	profiling,	gait	recognition,	handwriting	recognition,	keystroke	analysis	and	
voice	verification.	Plenty	of	research	has	been	carried	out	for	most	of	the	aforementioned	behavioural	tech-
niques	[5,	7,	11,	31].	However,	little	work	has	been	undertaken	in	the	area	of	behaviour	profiling.	
	
Behaviour	profiling	identifies	people	based	upon	the	way	in	which	they	interact	with	services	of	their	mobile	
devices.	In	a	behaviour	profiling	system,	a	user\textquoteright	s	current	activities	(e.g.	dialling	a	telephone	
number)	are	compared	with	an	existing	profile	(which	is	obtained	from	historical	usage)	by	using	a	classifica-
tion	method	(e.g.	a	Neural	Network).	The	user\textquoteright	s	identity	is	determined	based	upon	the	compar-
ison	result.	Therefore,	behaviour	profiling	systems	have	the	potential	to	provide	continuous	and	transparent	
identification	while	users	interact	with	their	device.	
	
Research	into	behaviour	profiling	started	around	1997	by	monitoring	user	calling	and	migration	behaviour	over	
service	providers\textquoteright		networks	to	detect	telephony	service	fraud.	An	overview	of	studies	and	their	
performance	characteristics	are	presented	in	Table	1.	For	call	based	fraud	detection	systems,	a	us-
er\textquoteright	s	profile	can	be	created	based	upon	various	calling	features	(e.g.	
International	Mobile	Subscriber	Identity	(IMSI)	and	start	date	of	call)	that	have	been	gathered	over	a	service	
provider\textquoteright	s	network	during	a	period	of	time	[2,	15,	24].	The	call	based	fraud	detection	system	
constantly	monitors	user\textquoteright	s	current	calling	activities	again	their	profiles.	An	alarm	will	be	raised	
if	the	deviation	between	the	current	calling	activity	and	the	user\textquoteright	s	profile	exceeds	a	predefined	
threshold.	
	
Based	upon	the	theory	that	people	have	a	predictable	pattern	when	they	travel	from	one	location	to	another,	
the	mobility	based	fraud	detection	system	monitors	a	mobile	user\textquoteright	s	location	activities	to	detect	
abnormal	behaviour	(e.g.	theft	of	the	device)	[3,	16,	28,	29].	By	using	user\textquoteright	s	historical	location	
information	that	can	be	obtained	either	from	a	mobile	cellular	network	in	the	form	of	cell	IDs	or	via	a	Global	
Positioning	System	(GPS)	link	through	latitudes	and	longitudes,	user\textquoteright	s	mobility	profile	can	be	
generated.	Similar	to	the	working	principle	of	the	call	based	fraud	detection	system	an	alarm	will	be	raised	if	
the	user\textquoteright	s	current	mobility	activity	significantly	deviates	from	his/her	profile.	
	
Table	1	A	review	of	network	based	mobile	behaviour	profiling	
	
	 Pattern	classification	model	 DR	 FAR	Calls		 Mathematical	formula	[24]	 80%		 3%	Calls		 Neural	networks	[15]	 50%		 0.02%	Calls		 RBF	neural	network	model	[2]	 97.5%	 4.2%	Mobility	 Bayes	decision	rule	[3]		 87.5%	 -	
Mobility	 High	order	Markov	model	[29]		 87.5%	 15%	Mobility	 Instance	based	learning	[16]		 50%	 50%	Mobility	 High	order	Markov	model	[28]		 89%		 13%	
	
By	monitoring	a	user\textquoteright	s	calling	or	location	activities,	behaviour	based	fraud	detection	systems	
offer	high	level	of	performance	in	terms	of	Detection	Rate	(DR)	and	False	Alarm	Rate	(FAR)	(as	demonstrated	
in	Table	1)	and	detect	unforeseen	attacks.	Also,	no	additional	computational	power	is	required	from	the	mo-
bile	device	as	the	detection	procedures	are	carried	out	over	the	service	provider\textquoteright	s	network.	
Such	solutions	have	been	ideal	for	protecting	traditional	mobile	devices	in	the	terms	of	fraud	as	these	devices	
cannot	carry	out	the	detection	task	by	themselves	and	they	are	mainly	utilised	to	access	telephony	and	text	
message	services.	Nonetheless,	as	modern	mobile	devices	have	the	ability	to	access	multiple	networks	and	
host	many	applications,	the	behavioural	based	fraud	detection	systems	cannot	provide	adequate	protection	
for	them	anymore.	Therefore,	a	new	system	that	can	offer	protection	for	all	networks	and	applications	which	
mobile	devices	connect	with	and	provide	is	needed.	The	next	section	will	describe	a	feasibility	study	into	be-
haviour	profiling	within	mobile	device	host	environment	via	user\textquoteright	s	application	usage.	
	
3	Behavioural	Profiling	on	Mobile	Devices	
	
It	is	widely	recognised	that	users	utilise	mobile	services	to	perform	a	variety	of	tasks	when	interacting	with	
individual	applications.	In	order	to	thoroughly	investigate	the	possibility	of	employing	the	behaviour	profiling	
technique	within	the	mobile	host	environment,	two	types	of	application	behaviour	will	be	examined	for	this	
research:	
• Standard applications: provide a basic level of information on how a mobile user utilises the device, such as 
the name of an application, the time when the application was accessed and the location at which it was uti-
lised.  
• Extended	applications:	offer	richer	and	more	discriminatory	information	than	standard	applications	do,	
i.e.	information	regarding	what	a	user	does	with	them	(e.g.	the	telephone	number	within	a	telephone	ap-
plication	and	a	web	address	within	an	Internet	browser	application).	
	
The	experiment	employed	a	publicly	available	dataset	that	is	provided	by	the	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Tech-
nology	(MIT)	Reality	Mining	project	[12].	The	MIT	Reality	Mining	dataset	contains	a	rich	amount	of	mobile	
user\textquoteright	s	application	activities	over	a	long	period	of	time:	106	participants	enrolled	for	the	data	
collection	process	from	September	2004	to	June	2005.	The	experiment	utilised	a	subset	of	participants	whose	
activities	occurred	during	the	period	of	24/10/2004-20/11/2004	to	maximise	the	number	of	participants.	If	
two	users	had	different	start	and	end	dates,	the	date	feature	alone	would	provide	the	discriminatory	infor-
mation	required	and	skew	the	experimental	result.	These	activities	include	101	standard	applications	and	two	
extended	applications	(telephony	and	Short	Message	Service	(SMS))	as	shown	in	Table	2.	Despite	some	ex-
tended	applications,	such	as	an	Internet	browser	application,	were	available	in	the	dataset,	the	extra	infor-
mation	(e.g.	visited	website)	was	not	captured;	hence,	they	were	treated	as	standard	applications.	It	was	the	
only	open	dataset	that	contained	sufficient	quantity	and	quality	of	data	to	allow	for	the	experiment	to	be	con-
ducted.	By	utilising	the	MIT	dataset,	three	sets	of	experimental	studies	were	conducted:	descriptive	statistics	
on	mobile	applications,	a	preliminary	study	on	the	telephony	service	and	behaviour	profiling	on	mobile	appli-
cations.	The	first	study	sought	to	better	understand	the	nature	of	the	data	with	a	view	to	identify	possible	
features	for	subsequent	analysis	and	evaluation.	The	second	study	was	conducted	to	identify	an	optimal	classi-
fier	for	solving	the	behaviour	profiling	issue	within	the	mobile	host	environment	and	to	determine	positive	
behaviour	profiling	features.	The	third	study	was	designed	to	examine	the	feasibility	of	employing	behaviour	
profiling	on	mobile	devices	through	application	activities.  
Table 2: The MIT dataset 
 Standard apps Telephony  SMS 
participants 76 71 22 
unique apps/telephone numbers 101 2,317 1,381 
logs 30,428 13,599 1,381 
	
3.1	Descriptive	Statistics	Analysis	
It	has	been	established	that	descriptive	statistics	has	the	ability	to	determine	potential	positive	features	for	
forming	unique	patterns	to	discriminate	individual	users	[18].	In	order	to	examine	potential	positive	features	
of	both	standard	and	extended	applications	for	behaviour	profiling,	two	sets	of	analysis	were	conducted	on	
the	data	presented	in	Table	2.	
	
For	standard	applications,	their	name,	time	and	location	of	access	features	were	available	from	the	dataset	
and	examined.	For	example,	usages	of	all	users\textquoteright		phonebook	application	features	are	shown	in	
Figure	1.	For	the	location	usage	comparison,	user	71	did	not	share	any	cells	with	any	other	users	(although	it	is	
difficult	to	visualise	due	to	the	large	cell	IDs	range	in	a	relative	small	graph).	As	a	result,	this	user	could	be	iden-
tified	based	upon	the	location	feature	alone.	On	average,	each	user	only	shared	2	cells	with	another	user.	For	
the	worst	case,	users	41	and	66	shared	10	cells.	Although	the	usage	on	these	10	cells	represent	70.8%	and	62.5%	
of	their	total	usage,	they	utilised	these	cells	very	differently:	user	41	spent	the	majority	of	location	usage	in	
cells	1,	77	and	18;	while	user	66	utilised	cell	49	most	of	the	time.	Therefore,	the	majority	of	their	usage	could	
still	be	separated.	For	the	comparison	on	the	time	of	accessing	feature	of	the	phonebook	application,	no	clear	
patterns	are	shown	between	individual	users	in	general	despite	the	figure	does	highlight	usage	differences	
between	several	groups	of	users	(i.e.	high,	medium	and	low).		
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Figure 1: Usage comparison of all users\textquoteright  phonebook features	
	
For	extended	applications,	the	name	of	the	application,	time	and	location	of	access,	plus	extra	information	the	
application	offers	were	available	from	the	dataset	and	analysed.	For	example,	Figure	2	depicts	the	usage	com-
parison	of	the	location	and	telephone	number	features	of	the	telephony	service	from	all	71	users.	For	usages	
comparison	of	the	location	feature	similar	patterns	were	presented		as	its	counterpart	of	the	phonebook	appli-
cation:	individual	users	could	be	identified	by	utilising	the	location	feature	alone.	For	the	comparison	on	the	
telephone	number	usage,	among	these	users,	user	26,	33	and	59	did	not	share	any	telephone	number	with	any	
other	users;	also	each	user	only	shared	one	telephone	number	with	another	user	on	average.	Hence,	the	ma-
jority	of	the	users	could	be	discriminated	from	each	other	based	upon	the	telephone	number	feature	alone.	
Nonetheless,	some	users	did	share	several	telephone	numbers	during	the	chosen	period.	For	instance,	user	34	
and	63	shared	9	telephone	numbers.	However	they	could	still	be	discriminated	between	each	other	as	user	34	
heavily	used	the	anonymised	telephone	number	1237	while	user	63	employed	the	anonymised	telephone	
number	1247	and	1271	most	of	time.	Regarding	the	time	of	call	feature	it	is	difficult	to	identify	individual	users	
by	using	it	in	isolation,	similar	to	the	situation	for	the	phonebook	application	For	the	duration	of	call	compari-
son,	no	clear	discriminative	information	is	available	as		the	majority	of	calls	lasted	less	than	300	seconds	(i.e.	
91.5%	of	13,719	calls).		
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Figure 2: Usage comparison on 71 users\textquoteright  telephony features 
	
The	statistical	study	demonstrates	that	the	chosen	dataset	contains	a	huge	amount	of	user\textquoteright	s	
mobile	applications	activities.	Although	it	could	be	seen	that	the	majority	of	the	users	utilised	their	devices	
differently	(especially	for	extended	applications),	a	level	of	similarity	was	also	observed	for	some	users	(i.e.	the	
applications	which	they	used	and	also	where	and	when	they	utilised	them).	Moreover,	a	number	of	features	
have	the	potential	to	be	used	for	discriminating	mobile	users.	For	the	standard	application,	users	could	be	
separated	via	the	name	of	individual	applications	if	they	did	not	utilise	the	same	applications.	For	those	who	
utilised	the	same	applications,	the	majority	of	them	could	still	be	discriminated	by	knowing	where	the	applica-
tion	was	used.	For	the	extended	applications,	apart	from	the	location	feature,	the	telephone	number	could	
also	be	very	useful	in	distinguishing	mobile	users.	However,	by	using	the	application	activation	time	feature	
alone,	it	could	be	challenging	to	discriminate	users	from	each	other.	This	may	be	caused	due	to	there	only	
being	24	hours	in	a	day:	the	longer	the	chosen	period	(i.e.	more	days),	the	higher	the	chance	that	two	users	
will	activate	the	same	application	within	a	similar	time	frame	or	even	at	the	same	time.	In	general,	no	clear	
difference	is	shown	by	the	duration	feature	of	telephony.	There	are	many	factors	which	may	affect	how	long	a	
call	may	last	(e.g.	the	relationship	between	calling	parties	or	how	often	they	communicate),	with	the	observed	
percentages	it	is	clear	that	it	could	be	difficult	to	discriminate	users	from	each	other	by	using	the	duration	of	
call	alone.	A	summary	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	aforementioned	features	towards	a	potential	successful	clas-
sification	of	mobile	users	is	summarised	in	table	3.	
	
Features Contributions 
Telephone num-
ber Positive 
Location Positive 
Duration of call Negative 
Time of call Negative 
Table 3: Individual application features towards to a successful classification 	
	
3.2	A	preliminary	study	utilising	telephony	activity	
	
The	selection	of	effective	features	is	a	critical	process	in	pattern	classification	as	the	system	performance	is	
closely	related	to	the	features	and	a	large	number	of	features	will	increase	the	complexity	and	the	size	of	the	
classifier	resulting	in	a	problem	known	as	the	curse	of	dimensionality	[1].	Also,	the	literature	on	behaviour	
profiling	identified	a	number	of	classification	methods	that	performed	well	and	they	fall	into	two	categories:	
statistical	and	neural	network	approaches.	Based	upon	the	no	free	lunch	theorems,	there	is	no	single	classifica-
tion	method	that	can	solve	all	given	problems	[31].	Three	classification	methods	were	chosen	from	these	cate-
gories	to	identify	an	optimal	classifier	and	explore	the	effectiveness	of	various	application	features	to	solve	the	
behaviour	profiling	within	the	mobile	host	environment.	These	were	the	Radial	Basis	Function	(RBF)	neural	
network,	the	Feed-Forward	Multi-Layered	Perceptron	(FF	MLP)	neural	network	and	a	Rule-based	approach.	
	
As	the	full	dataset	contains	a	total	of	45,408	logs	of	applications	activities,	it	could	require	a	large	amount	of	
time	to	identify	the	usefulness	of	each	application	feature	by	employing	the	whole	dataset.	As	the	purpose	of	
this	experiment	was	merely	to	identify	relevant	features	and	classifiers	rather	than	determining	the	perfor-
mance,	a	sub-dataset	that	was	extracted	from	the	telephony	activities	containing	a	total	of	3,836	logs	of	calls	
from	20	randomly	selected	users	was	utilised.	For	the	actual	experiment,	each	of	these	20	us-
ers\textquoteright		data	was	divided	into	two	halves	based	upon	the	date	of	initiation	feature:	the	first	half	
was	used	to	generate	a	profile	and	the	other	half	was	utilised	to	evaluate	the	performance	of	the	classifiers	
and	features	in	terms	of	False	Acceptance	Rate	(FAR,	False	Rejection	Rate	(FRR)	and	Equal	Error	Rate	(EER)	(e.g.	
the	lower	the	EER,	the	better	performance).	The	results	of	the	preliminary	study	are	presented	in	the	following	
subsections.	
	
3.2.1	Radial	Basis	Function	Network	
	
An	RBF	neural	network	has	been	one	of	most	popular	pattern	classification	methods	used	in	the	Artificial	Intel-
ligence	(AI)	field	[19].	By	default,	it	has	three	network	configurations:	number	of	neurons,	the	performance	
goal	and	spread.	For	this	preliminary	study,	only	the	number	of	neurons	setting	was	configured	while	the	other	
two	remained	as	default.	Table	4	demonstrates	the	results	achieved	by	the	optimal	RBF	neural	network	con-
figurations	with	several	combinations	of	telephony	features	as	the	inputs.	By	employing	the	dialled	telephone	
number	and	the	location	of	call	as	the	inputs	with	75	neurons,	the	RBF	network	achieved	the	best	perfor-
mance	with	an	EER	of	10.5%.	
	
Features 
Employed 
Number of 
neurons   EER 
1, 2, 3, 4 75   14.9% 
1, 2, 4 100   14.5% 
1, 2, 3 50   13% 
1, 2 75   10.5% 
Key: (1) Telephone No; (2) Location; (3) Duration; (4) Time 
Table 4: The best RBF network configurations with various telephony features 
	
3.2.2	Feed-Forward	Multi-Layered	Perceptron	(FF	MLP)	Network	
	
The	FF	MLP	network	is	another	widely	employed	AI	technique	utilised	in	the	pattern	classification	domain	[19].	
With	more	network	configuration	variables	available,	the	FF	MLP	neural	network	is	a	more	complex	classifier	
compared	with	the	RBF	neural	network.	For	this	preliminary	study,	apart	from	modifying	the	number	of	neu-
rons	parameter,	other	configurations	of	the	FF	MLP	neural	network	were	not	altered.	Table	5	demonstrates	
the	best	experimental	results	obtained	by	from	several	FF	MLP	network	configurations	with	various	combina-
tions	of	telephony	features.	By	using	the	dialled	telephone	number	and	the	location	of	calling	as	the	inputs	and	
applying	150	neurons,	the	FF	LMP	classifier	obtained	its	best	performance	producing	an	EER	of	17.5%.	
Features 
Employed 
Number of 
neurons   EER 
1, 2, 3, 4 125   21.3% 
1, 2, 4 100   20.6% 
1, 2, 3 150   24.7% 
1, 2 150   17.5% 
Key: (1) Telephone No; (2) Location; (3) Duration; (4) Time 
Table 5: The best FF MLP network configurations with various telephony features 
	
3.2.3	A	rule-based	approach	
The	basis	for	this	approach	was	derived	from	the	descriptive	statistics	produced	when	analysing	the	data	and	
the	large	variances	observed.	A	dynamic	approach	therefore	seemed	sensible	to	cope	with	the	changing	na-
ture	of	the	profile.	Based	upon	the	premise	that	the	historical	profile	can	be	utilised	to	predict	the	probability	
of	a	current	event,	the	rule-based	approach	illustrated	in	Equation	1	was	devised.	The	approach	provides	a	
mechanism	to	ensure	all	outputs	are	bounded	between	0	and	1	to	assist	in	defining	an	appropriate	threshold.	
	
Equation 1: Alarm if: 1 − #$$%&'($)	+,		-)'.%&)/0#$$%&'($)	+,		-)'.%&)/010234/23 5 ≥threshold 
Where: 
i=The features of one chosen application (e.g. dialled number for telephony application)  
x=The value of Featurei (e.g. office telephone number and home telephone number)  
M=Total number of values for Featurei 
N=Total number of features 
Threshold= A predefined value according to each individual user 
For	the	experiment,	all	parameters	within	the	formula	were	chosen	appropriately	according	to	the	selected	
telephony	features.	The	results	from	the	experiment	are	presented	in	Table	6.	By	using	the	dialled	telephone	
number	and	location	of	calling	features,	the	rule-based	approach	obtained	a	best	result	EER	of	11%.	
	
Features Em-
ployed   EER 
1, 2, 3, 4   20.1% 
1, 2, 4   12.4% 
1, 2, 3   19.7% 
1, 2   11% 
Key: (1) Telephone No; (2) Location; (3) Duration; (4) Time 
Table 6: Experimental results by employing the rule-based approach 
The	above	three	sets	of	results	have	demonstrated	that	the	users	can	be	discriminated	by	their	telephony	
service	within	the	mobile	host	environment	with	a	good	level	of	performance	and	also	the	usefulness	of	each	
application	feature	towards	the	classification	result.	Both	the	dialled	telephone	number	and	location	of	call	
features	proved	to	be	positive	for	discriminating	the	users	by	all	three	classifiers.	In	comparison,	neither	the	
time	nor	the	duration	of	call	feature	can	be	considered	as	contributing	positive	information	towards	the	classi-
fication	process	as	by	adding	either	or	both	of	them	as	the	inputs	the	performance	of	the	classifiers	decreased.	
In	addition,	the	effectiveness	of	these	features	(i.e.	location,	telephone	number,	time	and	duration	of	call)	was	
also	suggested	by	the	previous	statistical	analysis	presented	in	section	3.1.	
	
Among	the	three	chosen	classifiers,	the	FF	MLP	neural	network	achieved	the	worst	performance	while	both	
the	RBF	neural	network	and	the	rule-based	approach	achieved	much	better	performances.	Despite	the	RBF	
neural	network	had	a	slightly	higher	performance	(0.5%	EER)	it	also	consumed	at	least	twice	amount	of	com-
putational	power	than	the	rule-based	approach	did	(based	upon	observations	during	the	experimental	study).	
As	a	result,	the	rule-based	approach	was	employed	as	the	classifier	with	which	to	progress	the	next	step	of	the	
research	as	its	low	requirements	on	computing	power	which	is	a	key	limited	resource	within	the	mobile	envi-
ronment.	
	
3.3	Behaviour	profiling	on	mobile	applications	
Based	upon	the	findings	from	the	descriptive	statistics	and	preliminary	studies,	a	complete	experiment	was	
undertaken	on	mobile	user\textquoteright	s	application	usage	using	the	rule-based	approach.	In	addition	to	
the	static	profile	technique,	the	experiment	also	utilised	a	dynamic	profile	technique	to	minimise	the	impact	
that	is	caused	by	users\textquoteright		irregular	mobile	usage	which	was	observed	from	the	preliminary	study	
(i.e.	large	FRR	rates).	The	dynamic	profile	contains	7/10/14	days	of	each	users	most	recent	activities	that	was	
updated	on	a	daily	basis.	The	evaluation	process	for	both	static	and	dynamic	profile	techniques	was	carried	out	
on	the	same	dataset.	A	smoothing	function	that	treats	a	number	of	successive	applications	activities	as	one	
event	was	also	introduced	to	cope	with	the	mobile	user\textquoteright	s	inconsistent	and	variable	usage	be-
haviour;	therefore,	a	decision	is	made	based	upon	the	combined	events	rather	than	a	single	occurrence.	The	
following	sections	contain	a	complete	behaviour	profiling	experimental	study	on	mobile	user\textquoteright	s	
application	usage	considering	standard,	extended	and	multi-instance	applications.	
	
3.3.1	Standard	applications	profiling	
	
For	standard	applications,	the	experiment	employed	all	the	standard	applications	activities	that	are	presented	
in	Table	2.	The	application	name,	date	of	initiation	and	location	of	usage	features	were	extracted	for	generat-
ing	profiles	and	validating	the	performance	of	the	classifier.	A	complete	set	of	experimental	results	for	us-
ers\textquoteright		standard	application	usage	is	presented	in	Table	7.	The	best	performance	(EER	13.5%)	was	
obtained	by	utilising	a	14	day	dynamic	profile	with	the	smoothing	function	of	6	application	entries	(also	shown	
in	Figure	3).	
	
 
Number of application entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Static 14 days 21.1% 17.4% 16.3% 14.9% 14.2% 13.6% 
Dynamic 14 days 21.1% 17.3% 16.0% 14.5% 14.0% 13.5% 
Dynamic 10 days 22.1% 17.8% 16.2% 14.6% 14.4% 13.7% 
Dynamic 7 days 24.0% 19.4% 17.6% 15.9% 15.3% 14.4% 
Table 7: Experimental results for standard applications 
 
Figure 3: FAR-FRR plot for standard applications with the dynamic 14 day profile 
with 6 application entries 
3.3.2	Extended	applications	
The	telephone	call	experiment	employed	all	the	telephony	activities	as	described	in	Table	2.	The	telephone	
number,	date	and	location	of	call	were	extracted	for	the	purpose	of	profile	generation	and	data	evaluation.	A	
complete	set	of	experiment	results	for	users\textquoteright		telephone	call	usage	is	shown	in	Table	8.	The	best	
experimental	result	for	the	users\textquoteright		telephony	activity	is	an	EER	of	5.4%	and	it	was	achieved	by	
using	the	14	day	dynamic	profile	technique	with	the	smoothing	function	of	6	telephone	call	entries	(also	de-
picted	in	Figure	4).		
 
Number of telephone call entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Static 14 days 9.6% 9.1% 7.9% 7.2% 4.3% 6.4% 
Dynamic 14 days 8.8% 8.1% 6.4% 6.4% 6.3% 5.4% 
Dynamic 10 days 9.6% 8.6% 8.1% 7.2% 6.9% 6.0% 
Dynamic 7 days 10.4% 8.8% 8.5% 7.3% 7.0% 6.2% 
Table 8: Experimental results for the telephone call application 
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 Figure 4: FAR-FRR plot for the telephone call application with the dynamic 14 day 
profile with 6 telephone call entries 
	
The	SMS	experiment	utilised	the	SMS	message	data	as	described	in	Table	2.	For	each	SMS	log	entry,	the	texted	
telephone	number,	date	and	location	of	texting	were	extracted	for	building	profiles	and	examining	the	per-
formance	of	the	classifier.	As	several	participants	had	a	limited	number	of	messages	over	the	chosen	28	day	
period,	a	maximum	of	3	log	entries	were	utilised	for	the	smoothing	function.	The	complete	result	for	users	
SMS	application	usage	is	shown	in	Table	9.	The	best	result	is	an	EER	of	2.2%	and	it	was	acquired	by	the	classifi-
er	utilising	the	14	day	dynamic	profile	with	a	smoothing	function	of	3	text	message	entries	(also	shown	in	Fig-
ure	5).	
	
 
Number of text message entries 
1 2 3 
 
Static 14 days 7.0% 4.3% 3.6% 
Dynamic 14 days 5.7% 2.6% 2.2% 
Dynamic 10 days 8.3% 4.1% 3.7% 
Dynamic 7 days 10.7% 5.7% 3.8% 
Table 9: Experimental results for the SMS application 
 
Figure 5: FAR-FRR plot for the SMS application with the dynamic 14 day profile with 
3 text message entries 
In	daily	life,	mobile	users	utilise	their	applications	in	a	chronological	order.	For	instance,	a	user	switches	off	the	
alarm	clock	(standard	application)	at	6:05	AM;	at	7:10	AM,	they	make	several	phone	calls	(extended	applica-
tion)	and	start	listening	to	music	(standard	application)	at	7:36	AM.	Therefore,	the	multi-instance	applications	
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can	continuously	present	an	image	of	what	a	user	does	on	the	whole,	while	either	the	standard	or	extended	
applications	could	only	partially	provide	information	on	user\textquoteright	s	activity.	Hence,	an	experiment	
was	conducted	to	examine	the	performance	of	the	multi-instance	applications	technique	for	constantly	moni-
toring	every	single	activity	to	identify	abnormal	mobile	usage.	
	
For	the	multi-instance	applications	experiment,	all	users\textquoteright		applications	activities	that	are	pre-
sented	in	Table	2	were	utilised.	For	each	user,	their	standard	and	extended	applications	were	joined	together	
by	using	the	time	stamp	in	a	chronological	order.	Also,	features	were	selected	according	to	their	application	
categories.	In	total,	30,428	standard	and	15,101	extended	applications	logs	were	employed.	The	experimental	
results	for	user\textquoteright	s	multi-instance	applications	activities	are	demonstrated	in	Table	10.	By	utilis-
ing	the	dynamic	profiling	technique	with	10	days	of	profiling	data	and	a	smoothing	function	with	6	log	entries,	
the	best	result	of	EER	10%	was	obtained	(also	depicted	in	Figure	6).	
 
Number of log entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Static 14 days 16.9% 13.6% 12.7% 12% 10.9% 11% 
Dynamic  7 days 19 % 15.2% 13.1% 12.4% 11.3% 10.5% 
Dynamic 10 days 17.4% 13.7% 12.3% 11.6% 10.6% 9.8% 
Dynamic 14 days 16.5% 13.5% 12.1% 11.6% 10.5% 10.1% 
Table 10: Experimental results for multi-instance applications 
 
Figure 6: FAR-FRR plot for multi-instance applications with the dynamic 10 day pro-
file with 6 application entries 
3.3.3	Discussion	
	
In	general,	the	dynamic	profiling	technique	achieved	a	slightly	better	performance	than	the	static	profiling	
technique	did.	This	is	reasonable	as	a	dynamic	profile	contains	a	user\textquoteright	s	most	recent	activities	
rather	than	some	usage	that	occurred	several	weeks	ago	and	therefore	is	less	relevant	to	user\textquoteright	s	
current	behaviour.	Also,	the	performance	is	improved	with	a	longer	profile	period.	Hence,	an	increased	num-
ber	of	days	(e.g.	18/22	days)	of	user	activities	as	a	profile	should	be	examined	to	find	the	optimum	solution.	
Nonetheless,	[14]	suggests	that	users	only	keep	67%	of	new	applications	beyond	a	30-day	period	indicating	
that	users	do	change	their	usage	pattern	over	time.	While	the	smoothing	function	treated	more	application	
entries	as	one	incident,	the	performance	was	also	improved.	The	smoothing	function	reduces	the	impact	any	
single	event	might	have	and	seeks	to	take	a	more	holistic	approach	to	monitoring	for	misuse;	this	will	provide	
a	user-friendly	environment	as	fewer	rejections	occur	and	more	convenient	when	a	user	changes	their	usage	
behaviour.	However,	this	approach	does	take	a	longer	time	for	the	system	to	make	a	decision	providing	a	win-
dow	of	opportunity	for	misuse	and	a	degree	of	abuse	might	be	missed	by	the	security	control.	
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The	name	of	application	and	location	of	usage	are	valuable	features	that	can	provide	sufficient	discriminatory	
information	to	individuate	mobile	users	(as	shown	in	Table	7).	However,	whilst	this	might	identify	many	misuse	
scenarios,	it	would	not	necessarily	identify	all	cases	of	misuse	particularly	those	where	a	colleague	might	brief-
ly	misuse	a	device	because	the	location	information	is	likely	to	fall	within	the	same	profile	as	the	authorised	
user.	So	care	is	required	in	interpreting	these	results.	Limitations	in	the	dataset	are	also	likely	to	have	created	
certain	difficulties.	Due	to	the	small	number	of	mobile	applications	that	were	available	in	2004,	a	large	similari-
ty	of	application	usage	between	users	within	the	dataset	creates	difficulty	for	any	classification	method.	How-
ever,	it	is	envisaged	that	current	mobile	users	application	usage	would	arguably	differ	more	as	there	are	more	
than	1	million	applications	available	in	the	mobile	apps	market.	As	a	result,	it	would	be	arguably	easier	to	dis-
criminate	mobile	users	through	their	application	usage	now.	
	
The	performance	of	telephony	and	the	SMS	applications	are	generally	very	good	(as	demonstrated	in	Tables	8	
and	9)	more	than	twice	that	of	the	standard	application	profiling.	This	reinforces	the	hypothesis	that	knowing	
both	the	application	and	what	the	user	does	with	it,	improves	the	chance	of	identifying	individual	users	signifi-
cantly.	Moreover,	mobile	users	had	a	far	larger	set	of	telephone	contacts	(the	numbers	they	can	dial/text)	than	
applications,	making	the	classification	process	easier	with	more	identifiable	data	points	from	which	to	discrim-
inate.	
	
The	experimental	results	of	the	multi-instance	application	(as	presented	in	Table	10)	are	in	between	the	results	
from	the	standard	and	extended	applications;	this	is	within	the	expectation	as	the	experiment	utilised	the	
combination	of	both	types.	Based	upon	all	experimental	results,	it	is	envisaged	that	the	larger	the	proportion	
of	extended	applications	users	have,	the	better	the	performance	of	a	system.	As	a	result,	the	identification	
process	of	which	category	(either	standard	or	extended)	an	application	belongs	to	is	mission	critical	for	a	be-
haviour	profiling	system.		
	
Behavioural techniques EER 
Behaviour Profiling 10% 
Gait recognition [11] 20.1% 
Keystroke analysis [5] 13% 
Handwriting recognition [7] 1% 
Voice verification [32] 7.8% 
Table 11: The performance comparison of behavioural techniques on mobile devices 
The	performance	of	the	behaviour	profiling	technique	is	within	the	expectation	of	the	overall	behavioural	bi-
ometric	category	in	the	mobile	device	environment	(as	illustrated	in	Table	11).	However,	in	order	to	ensure	
this	technique	can	be	widely	adopted	by	users,	it	would	have	not	only	to	provide	additional	security	but	also	
user	convenience.	The	next	section	of	this	paper	describes	a	behaviour	profiling	framework	that	is	designed	to	
continuously	profile	and	verify	mobile	user\textquoteright	s	identity	in	a	transparent	style.	
	
4	A	Novel	Framework	for	Behaviour	Profiling	on	Mobile	Devices	
	
The concept of transparently authenticating mobile device users was first proposed by the Transpar-
ent Authentication System (TAS), which utilises a mixture of biometric techniques to verify a mobile 
user\textquoteright s identity in a continuous and transparent manner [4]. Based upon the foundation 
laid by TAS, the behaviour profiling framework employs the behaviour profiling approach to provide an 
enhanced security for the mobile device with minimum user inconvenience and the framework works 
in the following manner: 
• To improve the security for the mobile device beyond that offered by the password and token 
based approach;  
• To verify the user based upon their application usage in a continuous style;  
• To ensure the verification process is carried out in a user-friendly manner and that the user is main-
ly verified transparently rather than intrusively;  
• To provide an architecture that can operate in one of three modes based upon the desired output 
implementation: as a standalone security control, within an IDS system as a misuse detector or 
within a TAS.  
A number of process engines and a Security Manager have been devised to achieve these 
objectives (as illustrated in Figure 7). When a user utilises an application, details of the activ-
ity are automatically collected by a Data Collection Engine and then formulated into a behav-
ioural sample. A Behaviour Classification Engine compares the sample with a profile that is 
pre-generated by a Behaviour Profile Engine to determine the legitimacy of the user. Based 
upon the verification result, the Security Manager can make one of the following decisions 
according to the mode in which the framework operates: for the standalone mode, the Secu-
rity Manager individually handles the result and responses accordingly; otherwise, the Secu-
rity Manager forwards the result to a security management system (e.g. TAS) that makes 
any final decisions. A detailed description of this process is presented in the following sec-
tions.    
	
	
	
Figure 7: A novel Behaviour Profiling Framework 
4.1	Processing	Engines	
	
The	main	duty	of	the	Data	Collection	Engine	is	to	capture	a	mobile	user\textquoteright	s	application	activities.	
When	an	application	is	utilised,	the	Data	Collection	Engine	automatically	gathers	features	associated	with	that	
application	based	upon	the	information	presented	in	the	applications	storage.	The	features	can	be	either	re-
lated	to	the	system	level	information	of	the	application	(e.g.	the	name	of	the	application	and	location	of	usage)	
or	the	personalised	user	data	(e.g.	telephone	numbers	and	email	recipients).	
	
The	primary	function	of	the	Behaviour	Profile	Engine	is	to	generate	various	templates	by	utilising	the	combina-
tion	of	the	user\textquoteright	s	historical	data,	two	template	generation	algorithms	for	standard	and	extend-
ed	applications,	a	dynamic	profiling	technique	and	a	smoothing	function.	The	dynamic	profiling	technique	is	
employed	to	maintain	accuracy	of	the	templates.	While	the	smoothing	function	is	utilised	to	provide	a	user-
friendly	environment.	
	
The	Behaviour	Classification	Engine	provides	the	main	functionality	for	the	verification	process	when	a	verifica-
tion	requirement	is	met:	the	smoothing	function,	a	verification	time	or	the	sensitivity	of	an	application.	The	
criteria	of	the	smoothing	function	is	that	based	upon	the	experimental	results	presented	in	section	3,	a	verifi-
cation	will	not	be	performed	unless	a	total	of	6	applications	have	been	utilised.	The	verification	time	is	the	
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time	period	that	controls	how	long	the	Behaviour	Classification	Engine	has	to	wait	to	perform	verification.	
Within	the	verification	time,	the	requirement	of	the	smoothing	function	is	utilised	as	the	reference	for	verifica-
tion;	otherwise,	verification	processes	will	be	carried	out	regardless	of	the	requirement	of	the	smoothing	func-
tion;	this	forces	the	framework	to	always	provide	security	within	the	reference	timeframe.	The	sensitivity	of	
the	application	is	a	measure	of	the	value	of	the	application	and/or	its	data.	According	to	[22],	a	high	sensitive	
mobile	application	is	associated	with	high-risk	levels.	When	a	user	requests	access	to	a	high	sensitive	mobile	
application	but	the	current	security	status	of	the	device	is	below	the	requirement	for	accessing	it,	the	Behav-
iour	Classification	Engine	will	verify	any	applications	which	have	not	been	verified	and	update	the	security	
status	even	though	neither	of	the	aforementioned	requirements	is	met.	
	
The	Communication	Engine	acts	as	a	gateway	for	the	framework.	By	utilising	it,	the	framework	can	download	
application	features	information	from	an	online	repository	to	facilitate	the	data	collection	process.	When	the	
framework	operates	in	standalone	mode	and	the	device	is	locked	down,	the	Communication	Engine	sends	a	
code	to	the	user	by	using	which	they	unlock	their	device.	While	when	the	framework	operates	in	dependent	
mode,	the	communication	engine	works	as	a	bridge	between	the	framework	and	a	comprehensive	security	
management	system	by	forwarding	verification	results	and	accepting	commands	to/from	the	security	man-
agement	system.	
	
4.2	Security	Status	Module	
The main function of the Security Status Module is to maintain the System Security Status (SSS) level 
that constantly indicates how secure the system is. By utilising the SSS level, the framework can pro-
vide or deny access to the user accordingly. The SSS level is a numeric value in the range of -3 to 
+31: -3 indicates low security whilst +3 demonstrates high security; it is calculated based upon two 
critical factors: the performance factor of an application and the verification result. The performance 
factor is dynamically allocated to each application based upon their performance as demonstrated in 
Table 12.  
Table 12 Application Performance Factor 
Application Performance 
(EER) 
Factor 
0-2% 1 
2-4% 0.9 
4-6% 0.8 
6-8% 0.7 
8-10% 0.6 
10-12% 0.5 
12-14% 0.4 
14-16% 0.3 
16-18% 0.2 
>18% 0.1 
After the activity of an application is verified, a temporary value will be allocated based upon 
its performance factor. When a verification process involves more than one application, the 
temporary value will be obtained by combining the performance factor of each individual ap-
plication. Depending upon the verification result, the temporary value is then added to (veri-
fied successfully) or subtracted from (verified unsuccessfully) the existing SSS level to derive 
the current SSS level as shown in Figure 8. 
 
                                                
1 The boundaries defined on the numerical scale are only provided as a suggestion.  
Fig. 1. The SSS level calculation process 
\subsection{} 
 
Fig. 2. The SSS level degradation function 
	
4.3	Security	Manager	
	
The Security Manager is the brain of the framework as it co-operates with other elements to complete 
various tasks, including continuously verifying the user\textquoteright s identity, updating the perfor-
mance factor of an application and maintaining the SSS level.  
The	key	task	of	the	Security	Manager	is	to	monitor	the	current	SSS	level	and	make	subsequent	decisions	ac-
cordingly	when	the	user	requests	access	to	an	application.	This	is	achieved	by	utilising	an	SSS	Monitor	And	
Response	(SMAR)	algorithm	which	is	the	core	security	component	of	the	proposed	framework	(as	illustrated	in	
Figure	10).	The	algorithm	contains	three	main	checking	
stages	before	the	device	is	locked	down.	These	checking	stages	were	chosen	to	provide	a	high	level	of	user	
convenience	and	improved	security.	The	algorithm	employs	a	mixture	of	transparent	and	intrusive	methods	to	
verify	user\textquoteright	s	identity.	However,	it	is	envisaged	that	the	majority	of	legitimate	users	will	experi-
ence	transparent	phases;	while	intrusive	verification	challenges	are	only	utilised	to	ensure	a	us-
er\textquoteright	s	legitimacy	in	the	event	of	access	being	required	to	the	mobile	device	but	the	SSS	level	be-
ing	below	security	requirements.		
	
When	a	user	requests	access	to	an	application,	the	Security	Manager	initially	examines	the	sensitivity	of	the	
application	(either	high	sensitive	or	non-sensitive).	A	high-level	security	requirement	is	set	for	high	sensitive	
applications	as	they	are	associated	with	critical	information:	they	cannot	be	accessed	when	the	SSS	level	is	
below	2	unless	the	user	passes	an	intrusive	verification.	In	comparison,	the	security	requirement	for	non-
sensitive	applications	is	much	more	relaxed:	they	can	be	utilised	when	the	SSS	level	is	greater	or	equal	to	-2;	
otherwise,	an	intrusive	verification	will	be	used	before	the	application	can	be	accessed.	
	
For	the	second	checking	stage,	the	Security	Manger	compares	the	current	SSS	level	with	the	security	require-
ments.	If	the	requirements	are	met,	the	users	will	be	granted	access	to	the	application.	Otherwise,	further	
checking	will	be	performed	based	upon	the	nature	of	the	application.	If	the	application	is	a	non-sensitive	appli-
cation,	the	user	will	be	challenged	with	a	randomly	selected	security	question;	if	the	application	is	associated	
with	high	sensitive	information,	the	Security	Manger	will	utilise	the	third	verification	requirement	as	described	
earlier	and	perform	any	subsequent	actions.	
	
For	the	final	checking	stage,	the	Security	Manger	utilises	a	randomly	selected	security	question	as	the	intrusive	
verification	method	to	verify	the	user\textquoteright	s	identity.	An	intrusive	flag	that	indicates	how	many	
times	the	intrusive	verification	method	is	utilised	increases	by	1	when	the	user	answers	the	question;	by	de-
fault,	the	value	of	the	intrusive	flag	is	0.	The	user	will	be	granted	access	to	the	application	if	the	question	is	
correctly	answered.	Also,	the	current	SSS	level	will	be	increased	by	a	value	(e.g.	
1)	and	the	intrusive	flag	will	be	set	to	0.	Otherwise,	the	intrusive	flag	remains	the	same	and	the	user	will	be	
challenged	again	if	the	value	of	the	flag	is	not	greater	than	2.	When	the	value	of	the	flag	equals	3,	the	device	
will	be	locked	down	and	only	an	administrative	security	password	can	unlock	it.	When	a	correct	unlock	code	is	
entered,	both	the	value	of	the	intrusive	flag	and	the	SSS	level	will	be	set	to	0	and	the	user	will	be	able	to	access	
the	device	once	again.	
 
 Request access for an Application
Is the application 
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Is the current SSS 
level smaller than -2?
Is the current SSS 
level less than 2? 
Is there any application not 
verified before requesting 
access on this application? 
Verify these 
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the SSS level 
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Fig.10. Security Manager: SSS Monitor And Response algorithm 
The	three-stage	SMAR	algorithm	of	the	Security	Manager	is	the	core	component	of	the	framework	to	adjust	
the	balance	between	user	convenience	and	system	security.	For	non-sensitive	applications,	the	user	conven-
ience	is	achieved	by	allowing	users	to	have	at	least	two	transparent	chances	(depends	upon	the	performance	
of	individual	applications)	to	verify	themselves	correctly	before	being	intrusively	authenticated.	As	a	result,	it	is	
envisaged	that	if	the	system	is	working	correctly,	the	SSS	level	should	be	high	enough	to	permit	automatic	
access	for	legitimate	users	and	their	experience	of	intrusive	security	challenges	will	be	minimal.	Nonetheless,	
the	same	configuration	would	also	permit	potential	misuse	on	mobile	applications	as	long	as	the	SSS	level	is	
above	the	threshold	(i.e.	not	smaller	than	-2).	This	phenomenon	is	difficult	to	avoid	for	any	behavioural	based	
biometric	due	to	the	trade-off	between	the	FAR	and	the	FRR.	However,	if	the	imposter	continuously	abuses	
mobile	services,	the	probability	of	misuse	that	goes	under	the	radar	of	the	framework	is	getting	smaller	as	
eventually	the	SSS	level	will	be	reduced	to	the	threshold	and	the	device	will	be	locked	down.	For	sensitive	ap-
plications,	due	to	the	higher	security	requirement	for	them,	the	chance	of	users	being	intrusively	verified	at	
the	beginning	of	usage	is	significantly	higher	compared	with	when	they	access	non-sensitive	applications.	This	
intrusiveness	will	be	gradually	reduced	as	legitimate	users	continuous	activities	will	keep	the	SSS	level	high	
enough	allowing	automatic	access	to	sensitive	applications.	However,	the	chance	of	imposters	accessing	sensi-
tive	applications	is	virtually	impossible	as	their	activities	likely	differ	from	legitimate	users	profile	forbidding	
the	SSS	level	to	satisfy	the	requirements	for	access	to	sensitive	applications.	
	
When the framework works in the dependent mode, it can become a component for an au-
thentication security mechanism (e.g. TAS) or an IDS security mechanism (e.g. the 
Knowledge-based Temporal Abstraction (KBTA) method [25]) to complete these mecha-
nisms and enhance their ability and performance. Therefore, the Security Manager only pro-
vides a verification result and the final decision will be made by the other security mecha-
nisms. As a result, it would be difficult to evaluate the performance and impact of the frame-
work on other security mechanisms when it operates in the dependent mode.	
 
5 Evaluation  
In order to understand the effect that the framework has upon the overall performance, two 
aspects of the framework should be examined: the impact on the processing power and the 
effectiveness of authenticating the user. Regarding consumption of the processing power, 
previous research demonstrates that a complicated multimodal biometric authentication sys-
tem (i.e. TAS) was prototyped within the mobile environment and users were satisfied with 
their performance [8]. Therefore, it is envisaged that the proposed framework will have a 
small processing power footprint and little effect on the performance of the mobile device. 
For the performance of authentication, the framework was evaluated via a simulation pro-
cess which was conducted within the Matlab environment. The simulation system employed 
the same 76 users\textquoteright  4 weeks mobile activities which were utilised in section 3 
as the simulation data. For each user, their activities were divided into two halves, containing 
first and second two-week activities respectively. A user\textquoteright s profile was initially 
trained by utilising the first two-week worth of activities; with the profile then being updated 
on a daily basis. The rest of users\textquoteright  activities were employed to evaluate the 
performance of the Behaviour Profiling framework. Furthermore, due to the lack of sensitive 
application usage within this dataset, the text message application was selected as a sensi-
tive application in order to evaluate the effect upon the framework. During the chosen period, 
22 users utilised the text message application, representing 4.3% of the total application us-
age.   
As discussed in section 4, the performance of the framework can be influenced by three key 
parameters: the smoothing function, the verification time and the degradation function. 
Therefore, the evaluation sought to analyse the effect these parameters have upon the per-
formance. As such, four scenarios were set up to independently assess each parameter in 
turn, as illustrated in Table 13. Time periods for the degradation function were set between 
1-60 minutes with a 10-minute interval for all four scenarios.  
Table 13. Four scenarios for the simulation process 
Scenario A Smoothing function: 1 application; Verification time: NA 
Scenario B Smoothing function: 3 applications; Verification time: 3 minutes 
Scenario C Smoothing function: 3 applications; Verification time: 6 minutes 
Scenario D Smoothing function: 6 applications; Verification time: 6 minutes 
5.1 Simulation results  
The framework was configured according the setup in Table 13. Based upon the verification require-
ment of the Behaviour Classification Engine (in section 4), a user\textquoteright s application activity 
will be verified as soon as one application is utilised; therefore, the verification time is not applicable. 
The simulation results for scenario A are presented in Table 14.  
Table14 Simulation results of scenario A 
 Non-sensitive 
apps 
Sensitive 
apps 
Overall apps 
FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
1 min 9.05 4.35 98.89 0 12.91 4.17 
10 mins 8.97 4.35 91.76 0 12.53 4.17 
20 mins 8.88 4.36 85.9 0 12.19 4.17 
30 mins 8.82 4.36 83.04 0 12.01 4.17 
40 mins 8.71 4.36 79.87 0 11.77 4.17 
50 mins 8.66 4.36 76.86 0 11.59 4.17 
60 mins 8.6 4.36 74.8 0 11.45 4.17 
In comparison with the configuration of scenario A, scenario B employed more applications 
for the smoothing function, allowing the smoothing function to work with up to 3 application 
activities. According to the verification requirements of the Behaviour Classification Engine, 
within the 3 minutes verification time window, applications will be processed when the total 
number being utilised reaches 3. Otherwise, any utilised applications will be verified even the 
total number of them is smaller than 3. Table 15 demonstrates the simulation results for sce-
nario B.  
Table 15 Simulation results of scenario B 
 Non-
sensitive aps 
Sensitive apps Overall apps 
FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
1 min 8.05 3.41 100 15.29 13.06 4.07 
10 mins 7.87 3.42 94.28 15.29 12.53 4.08 
20 mins 7.75 3.42 88.8 15.29 12.08 4.08 
30 mins 7.72 3.42 85.95 15.29 11.88 4.08 
40 mins 7.64 3.42 81.89 15.29 11.58 4.08 
50 mins 7.62 3.42 78.57 15.29 11.38 4.09 
60 mins 7.57 3.42 77 15.29 11.24 4.09 
Based upon the setup of scenario B, scenario C utilised a longer verification time; this in-
creases the potential for allowing more application activities to be processed within one 
smoothing function. Based upon the requirement of the Behaviour Classification Engine, 
application activities will be classified as soon as the total number of them reaches 3 within 
the 6 minutes verification time window; when the 6 minutes verification time window is sur-
passed, even if the total number of application activities is smaller than 3, they will be pro-
cessed. Simulation results of scenario C are presented in Table 16.  
Table 16 Simulation results of scenario C 
 Non-sensitive 
apps 
Protected apps Overall apps 
FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
1 min 7.96 2.45 100 26.39 13.3 3.95 
10 mins 7.83 2.46 96.23 26.39 12.89 3.96 
20 mins 7.66 2.46 90.64 26.39 12.36 3.96 
30 mins 7.63 2.46 87.8 26.39 12.15 3.96 
40 mins 7.54 2.47 84.07 26.39 11.79 3.96 
50 mins 7.51 2.47 80.85 26.39 11.58 3.97 
60 mins 7.45 2.47 79.26 26.39 11.43 3.97 
In comparison with the setup for scenario C, scenario D employed a higher number of appli-
cations for the smoothing function; this allows the smoothing function to potentially work with 
up to 6 application activities. According to the verification requirements for the Behaviour 
Classification Engine, within the 6 minutes verification time, application activities will be clas-
sified once there are 6 applications being utilised. When the 6 minutes verification time is 
exceeded, application activities will be processed by the Behaviour Classification Engine 
even though the total number of activities is less than 6. The simulation results for scenario 
D are presented in Table 17.  
 
Table 17 Simulation results of scenario D 
 Non-sensitive 
apps 
Protected apps Overall apps 
FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
1 min 7.97 2.48 100 26.73 13.58 4.04 
10 mins 7.85 2.49 96.19 26.73 13.2 4.04 
20 mins 7.77 2.49 90.71 26.73 12.7 4.05 
30 mins 7.69 2.49 87.46 26.73 12.42 4.05 
40 mins 7.58 2.49 84.08 26.73 12.03 4.05 
50 mins 7.57 2.5 80.76 26.73 11.82 4.05 
60 mins 7.49 2.5 78.86 26.73 11.63 4.05 
5.2 Discussion  
In order to evaluate the performance of the framework, the most widely utilised PIN based technique 
was chosen as a baseline method. In order to maximise the security, it is assumed that a PIN is re-
quired after the mobile device has been idle for more than one minute. By utilising this setting, the PIN 
based method was applied to the same simulation data, requiring users to enter a PIN for every single 
application usage (0% transparent authentication). In comparison, taking scenario A as it is the most 
similar configuration to the PIN-based approach shows the Behaviour Profiling framework achieved 
an overall FRR of 11.45%, indicating that 88.55% of the time the legitimate user will be transparently 
verified and automatically obtain access to the device. With the same configuration, the imposter has 
only got a 4.17% chance to misuse an application and conversely 95.83% of the time they will be de-
nied access. It is worth noting the above simulation results did not include the intrusive stage of the 
authentication process. Therefore, in reality, it is highly likely that the imposter will be intrusively 
prompted with a randomly selected security question and hence the device will be locked down, re-
sulting in an improved overall FAR. Arguably, the Behaviour Profiling framework is capable of provid-
ing continuous and transparent protection for a good proportion of the time and is able to do so in a 
more secure and user convenient fashion.  
The smoothing function, verification time and degradation function are employed to justify 
the balance between the user\textquoteright s convenience and system security and their 
impact were also examined through the simulation scenarios. As demonstrated by the simu-
lation results (from Table 14-17), the best system performance (11.24% for overall FRR and 
4.09% for overall FAR) was obtained by utilising a combination of the smoothing function set 
to 3 applications, a verification time of 3 minutes and  degradation function of 60 minutes 
(scenario B). With other configurations, the overall system performance decreased slightly. 
What the simulation results have shown is the effect these parameters have upon the 
framework and the need to ensure they are set on an individual rather than population basis 
so that the system can be configured to optimally perform given an individual us-
ers\textquoteright  behaviour profile.  
	
	
6	Conclusions	and	Future	Work	
	
The	first	part	of	this	paper	demonstrated	a	feasibility	study	which	showed	that	by	utilising	a	number	of	classifi-
ers,	mobile	device	users	can	be	discriminated	from	each	other	based	upon	their	application	usage.	The	rule	
based	approach	proved	the	most	suitable	classifier	for	mobile	device	users	in	terms	of	performance	and	com-
putational	power.	The	dynamic	profiling	and	smoothing	techniques	were	also	put	in	place	to	cope	with	the	
inconsistency	of	user	behaviour	and	as	a	result	better	performance	was	obtained.		
	
Based	upon	the	promising	experimental	result,	the	second	part	of	this	paper	proposed	the	Behaviour	Profiling	
framework	and	described	its	core	components	and	functionalities.	The	framework	is	able	to	provide	a	contin-
uous	and	non-intrusive	verification	mechanism	in	standalone,	TAS	or	IDS	modes.	By	monitoring	users	applica-
tion	activities,	the	SMAR	algorithm	can	continuously	evaluate	the	system	security	status	based	upon	which	the	
framework	can	a	decision	whether	to	grant	the	access	to	users.	The	framework	is	subsequently analysed 
utilising a real user dataset in a set of scenarios, providing conclusive evidence that it can 
provide transparent identity verification a good proportion of the time - thereby outperforming 
traditional PIN-based authentication. However, the work is still required on improving the 
level of accuracy.  
 
Future work will focus into two directions. Firstly upon developing a fully functioning proto-
type of the proposed framework so that a series of studies examining the practical usability 
of the approach can be measured. Secondly to undertake a wide-spread data collection ac-
tivity so that a modern and relevant corpus of behavioural-based data exists from which al-
gorithms and models can be tested and evaluated.   
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